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InTroDucTIon
The international debate over reducing worldwide carbon emissions increasingly focuses on effectively reducing carbon emissions by formulating novel policy tools after 
the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. One recommendation posits 
that if a tax is levied on carbon emissions it would promote envi-
ronmentally-minded business decisions, encourage incremental 
investment in new clean technology, attract the necessary level 
of capital formation in impacted sectors, and achieve national 
and global environmental goals. Yet, to effectively reduce car-
bon emissions, businesses and individuals will have to adopt 
significant lifestyle and behavioral changes and endorse choices 
with dramatic economic consequences. Rather than dwelling on 
the immediate impacts on business and household budgets, all 
users of energy must eventually confront and assume respon-
sibility for reducing the economic and environmental conse-
quences of carbon emissions. Once governed under the law of 
“commons,” carbon will now become governed by the laws of 
science, physics, and economics in global markets. To this end, 
the most effective plan will ensure that all sources of carbon are 
meaningfully addressed. 
If economic markets were forced to integrate the cost of 
environmental externalities caused by carbon emissions into 
the costs of doing business, the ensuing price signals and eco-
nomic incentives would force a dramatic shift toward develop-
ing cleaner energy sources and more sustainable energy habits. 
Economic consequences will likely be imposed on the industries 
that created carbon emissions if there is any hope of effectively 
reversing the legacy of environmental damage. This Article 
argues that implementing a tax on carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
imposes economic accountability and would impact the use of 
precious resources in a more direct, transparent, and sustainable 
manner than any proposed cap-and-trade program. The critical 
issue is managing the perceived political consequences of exer-
cising such policy choices.
A carbon tax would directly influence both industry and 
individual behavior with transparency, fairness, speed, and bal-
ance. Industry would have an economic incentive to reduce 
their carbon emissions to avoid the tax, which would likely 
be a cost passed on to consumers, and thus, the price signals 
created would modify consumer behavior. Accurate price sig-
nals for carbon (with diminished volatility) will also direct the 
marketplace so that clean renewable sources of power, energy 
efficiency, demand-side management, and combined heat and 
power technologies enjoy a level playing field with the CO2-
producing conventional fossil fuel generation resources. A cap-
and-trade system will reward traders, commodities merchants, 
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and financial institutions. An astute use of the federal tax system 
can build companies, development of equipment and technol-
ogy, and ensure that physical investments are made in sustain-
able business models. 
But the question remains whether the carbon tax is ready 
for widespread application in light of the clear impediments 
to, and uncertainty about, a cap-and-trade system. Currently, 
carbon trading cannot establish with reasonable accuracy how 
much carbon is being bought and sold over a period of time. 
The product is not physical, it is not readily usable, and the pur-
chaser faces limited utility after the purchase is consummated. It 
is also subject to a level of reliance on fiduciary conduct that has 
been compromised in past decades and is not fully embedded 
in all global financial and legal systems. Industry self-reporting 
will remain an essential component to any new CO2 emissions-
control system, but the most effective policies will institute a 
further measure of verification and transparency. No technology 
can confirm and validate such continuous emissions monitoring 
for new CO2 products in support of a cap-and-trade system.
carbon Tax basIcs
A “carbon tax” is a tax on the carbon content of fuels; effec-
tively, it is a tax on the CO2 emissions produced from burning 
fossil fuels.1 The current prices of gasoline, electricity, oil, coal, 
and other fuels do not include the full economic costs of the 
health, resource, and environmental externalities associated with 
the broad usage of these energy sources in the United States and 
around the world. The failure to force industry and consumers to 
shoulder these externalities suppresses the economic incentive 
to develop and implement carbon-reducing measures like energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, advanced metering, storage, addi-
tional transmission, or clean technology. On the other hand, 
taxing fuels based on their carbon content infuses these incen-
tives at every point in the chain of production and consumption, 
from an individual’s choice of the type and usage of vehicles, 
appliances, and housing, to business choices of product design, 
capital investment, facilities location, and government’s choices 
when setting regulatory policy direction.2 
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Tax vs. cap-anD-TraDe
Regardless of whether creating a price for carbon emis-
sions takes the form of a tax or tradable emissions allowances, 
the cost of carbon emissions will 
be passed through to the ultimate 
consumers. This fundamental 
market result occurs while ninety-
eight percent of United Kingdom 
(“U.K.”) businesses recognize it 
is important to reduce the envi-
ronmental impact of industry.3 
Over fifty percent of U.K. com-
panies today are struggling with 
long-term strategic and business 
modeling decisions in the face 
of the current unstable policy 
and tax environment.4 Interest-
ingly, after global cap-and-trade 
emissions trading experience, 
almost sixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of 
the tax system to provide incentives for them to become car-
bon neutral.5 Only the public policy processes fail to recognize 
this current market-based distinction in managing what has been 
characterized as one of the greatest market failures in the world 
today—that failure to clearly account for the externalities of fos-
sil fuel use.
pRice pReDictability
A carbon tax sets a market clearing price that encourages 
predictable energy prices. Predictability is important because 
when future energy and power prices can be reliably calculated 
in advance, energy-critical decisions can be made with the full 
awareness of carbon price signals. Once these price signals are 
added to the costs that industry must factor into the cost of doing 
business, they can affect plant and building design consider-
ations, new clean technology development, electricity storage 
and deployment for industry, and appliance selection and the 
purchase of the family car for the individual.6 
The United States has had tradable permits for sulfur diox-
ide (“SO2”) since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990. In that period, the tradable permits have varied in 
price by over forty percent.7 Yet due to carbon’s higher relative 
market penetration within the United States and global economy, 
compared to that of SO2, similar price fluctuations would likely 
affect all aspects of the U.S. economy, including consumer 
spending, budgeting, capital expansion, and inflation.8 
Simple aDminiStRation 
The carbon content of every form of fossil fuel is pre-
cisely known, as is the amount of CO2 released when that fuel 
is burned.9 This precision presents few technical problems for 
documentation or measurement. The type of fuel and the amount 
purchased or used is already tracked by most industrial and pri-
vate consumers. Thus, instituting a carbon tax would require 
few, if any, additional reporting or accounting burdens, while 
enjoying clarity and transparency.
In addition, administering the carbon tax could utilize cur-
rent tax collection mechanisms and existing enforcement, com-
pliance, reporting, and administrative resources. In contrast, 
the cap-and-trade approach 
embraced by the financial 
industry envisions creating a 
complex new system for com-
pliance reporting, audits, and 
verification with an uncertain 
value proposition in return. 
Without developing rigorous 
new accounting and verifica-
tion mechanisms, such a sys-
tem is unworkable and will 
be highly volatile and subject 
to gaming, thereby undermin-
ing confidence and certainty in 
planning the outcome. A carbon 
tax is much more feasible than 
a cap-and-trade system, except for the threat of its dire political 
consequences.
timing
A carbon tax can be implemented much more quickly than 
a cap-and-trade program. This factor is critical to the effective-
ness of any CO2 emissions reduction policy because time is of 
the essence from a scientific performance basis.10 So far, cap-
and-trade has proven to be unsuccessful in reducing carbon 
emissions in the European Union and other global markets.11 
Although a cap-and-trade system has been extremely success-
ful in the United States for reducing SO2 emissions in the past 
decade, the SO2 model is not dispositive for carbon. A carbon 
cap-and-trade program will have to be designed one hundred 
times larger in scale than its SO2 counterpart, which creates an 
enormous problem of scale, complexity, administration, and 
cost of compliance for cross-border purposes. In a comparable 
example, the success of the U.S. acid rain program required 
solid data collection and transparent verification combined with 
the use of continuous emissions monitoring technology. Read-
ily available technology does not currently exist for filtering or 
capturing CO2. Carbon storage or sequestration will likely take 
another decade to become cost effective and will create opera-
tional de-rating of ten to thirty percent, water supply demands, 
fuels shifting, and higher operating costs to succeed. 
Cap-and-trade systems are also complex and difficult to 
design. Issues concerning the proper level of the cap, timing, 
allowance allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures, 
standards for use of offsets, penalties and regional conflicts must 
all be addressed before the system can be implemented.12 These 
issues require complex operational and political considerations 
that surely would hinder any timely solution to regulating U.S. 
CO2 emissions. Further, while this design and implementation 
process is taking place, polluters are free to continue unchecked 
while uncertainty reigns for another decade. A cap-and-trade 
approach for CO2 will not be as effective as a carbon tax in the 
A carbon tax would 
directly influence 
both industry and 
individual behavior with 
transparency, fairness, 
speed, and balance.
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short term because it will lag behind the needs of the market-
place, scientific inquiry, and global policy making. It would not 
offer transparency, nor a clear stable price signal to support capi-
tal investment and new investment decision-making until 2020.
leSS FRauD anD manipulation
The protracted negotiations necessary to develop a compre-
hensive and politically acceptable carbon cap-and-trade program 
leave the process vulnerable to parties shaping the program to 
maximize narrow economic benefits, maximizing their market 
positions in industry sectors, or constraining competition rather 
than designing an economically 
efficient system that maximizes 
public gain and a competitive 
U.S. economy. In a cap-and-
trade program, although market 
prices will increase, just as with 
a carbon tax, the reasons for the 
increase are hidden in a maze 
of new bureaucracy, regulatory 
impositions, and cost partner-
ships that render it more opaque 
and politically attractive.
A carbon tax can be implemented with far less opportu-
nity for manipulation. Carbon taxes are transparent and easily 
understandable by the public. Once the market targets for carbon 
are set, they can be readily adjusted according to market suc-
cess or failure. However, it is this transparency and flexibility 
that makes a carbon tax politically undesirable because it is clear 
where and how society will have to take responsibility, make 
direct changes and improvements, and pay for the CO2 by-prod-
ucts of society. 
cap-anD-tRaDe iS a tax in anotheR FoRm
The key attribute of cap-and-trade that has made it so popu-
lar is that future emission targets for reductions are fixed and 
known. This is mostly propaganda, however, because most cap-
and-trade systems under development include a “safety-valve” 
provision. This safety valve would counter the operations of 
markets and provide for the auctioning of additional allowances 
if the price exceeds a certain predetermined value.13 In addition, 
the knowledge of the future trajectory of carbon emissions is 
questionably valuable because there is no agreed-upon trajectory 
for achieving climate stability and preventing disaster.14 
Cap-and-trade programs have traditionally provided initial 
allowances for free. Freely giving away financial assets prevents 
the government from reducing the economic costs of carbon con-
trol by cutting taxes elsewhere, or by providing rebates to pro-
tected classes of consumers. Certain industries capitalize upon 
the economic benefit and prioritize the costs in products regard-
ing services, which flow generally to utilities and traditional 
energy providers. Costs are passed through twice to consumers; 
this was the case in European electricity markets following the 
European Emissions Trading System. While the newer proposed 
cap-and-trade programs include a government auction of per-
mits to generate revenue and emulate the advantage of a carbon 
tax,15 I argue it is more effective to skip the middleman with 
its administrative costs and complexity, verification problems, 
and lack of transparency in favor of a clear tax. To succeed, the 
carbon tax would need to be coupled with other tax offsets in the 
tax code to be revenue neutral, and be managed in trust to avoid 
profligate political expenditures.
economic eFFiciency
Setting a clearing price for carbon that can be periodi-
cally evaluated for its effectiveness in achieving public policy 
and market performance objectives is a simpler and more eco-
nomically efficient approach 
than a cap-and-trade program. 
The cost of carbon can be set 
through a tax mechanism, and 
its progress in reducing energy 
intensity can be evaluated every 
five years. This built-in evalu-
ation process permits adjust-
ments to be made, which will 
ensure achievement of emis-
sion reduction goals. Technical 
inputs can be provided by DOE, 
EPA, NOAA, and the National Academy of Science each cycle 
for review with final economic evaluations of the tax conducted 
by Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
In the United States, potential economic harm could be 
diminished by offsetting the revenue resulting from a new car-
bon tax upon its enactment, with mirroring reductions in the 
payroll tax, the corporate tax rate, and the alternative minimum 
tax. Additional revenue can be reserved in trust for government 
funding of clean energy technology and advanced energy R&D. 
Economic feedback would be provided with balance to ben-
efit the corporate, small business, and individual tax payers to 
reduce the economic burden of the new carbon tax scheme by 
starting with a tax that is “revenue neutral.” The key effective-
ness of a carbon tax program that is currently being overlooked 
is that such a tax may become revenue neutral. Revenue neutral-
ity shifts the economic burden to industries requiring behavioral 
and competitive modification consistent with global policy shifts 
while preserving efficiency, energy intensity, and benefits of sta-
bility in the U.S. economy. No cap-and-trade proposal offers 
similar revenue neutrality and the specter of economic stability. 
Rather, cap-and-trade arguably creates some market winners, 
many market or industry sector losers, opportunities for gaming, 
and makes U.S. consumers the biggest losers of all.
Issues In DesIgnIng The carbon Tax
None of the current carbon tax discussions are ready for 
implementation yet for several reasons:
1.  lack oF aDequate enFoRcement anD  
StRategy FoR tax
Additional tax and energy specialists would need to 
be shifted from the U.S. DOE and EPA to the U.S. Treasury 
Department. Initially, additional staffing would be required for 
A carbon tax can be 
implemented much more 
quickly than a  
cap-and-trade program. 
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the additional rulemaking, audits, enforcement, and advisory 
work. Tax treaties and the World Trade Organization are in 
place to administer international consequences. Within a decade, 
administrative precedents could be established, and staffing 
management would likely decline as the tax system is largely 
self-implementing thereafter.
2. ability to Ratchet
The whole reason for implementing a tax for carbon is to 
harness economic power to quickly attack a serious environmen-
tal problem. The goal is to create a market for reducing green-
house gas emissions in order to avoid the extraordinary costs 
of climate change-induced adaptation. To ensure that emissions 
reductions are actually occurring, rather than simply permitting 
people to pay more in order to emit much like they are paying 
more to continue to drive, a ratcheting mechanism can be stud-
ied. The ratchet would periodically increase the tax rate depend-
ing on the emission reductions achieved, evaluated every five 
years through the processes shared above. This will provide a 
consistent price signal to encourage development of less carbon-
intensive technologies, accelerate clean technology deployment 
and planning certainty, and stimulate a societal behavioral shift 
toward sustainable business and commercial practices to main-
tain U.S. competitiveness.
This ratcheting plan was introduced to the House of Rep-
resentatives in April 2007 when Representative Stark (D-CA) 
introduced a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
to impose a tax on fossil fuels based on their carbon content.16 
This structure could be adapted to begin at $10 per ton of car-
bon content and increased by $10 per ton every five years until 
the United States reaches an annual emissions level that does 
not exceed a specified level of CO2 emissions. This structure 
would reward early company actions and establish an economic 
benchmark, while recording market reaction and response and 
managing price volatility.
3.  not aS woRkable FoR tRanSpoRtation  
anD commeRcial builDingS
The cap-and-trade system or carbon tax may not impact the 
transportation and commercial building sectors as effectively 
as the electric power production sector. More focus is provided 
on stationary sources through cap-and-trade while mobile and 
building sources are ignored. The new fuel efficiency standards 
for passenger and non-passenger vehicles, however, will create 
a more direct impact on the transportation sector. In addition, 
green buildings could benefit from a required market evaluation 
of energy efficiency improvements in building appraisals upon 
sale or resale. Moreover, a cost of capital, insurance reductions 
and resale valuation “adders” from LEED certified new or exist-
ing buildings could be implemented with clearer market signals. 
Federal tax credits, accelerated depreciation, state building codes, 
and state tax incentives could round out this market for construc-
tion where substantial CO2 savings are possible through funding 
with carbon tax revenues. The new recognition of forestry and 
agricultural impacts might also favor a tax solution to cut back 
administrative costs in these important carbon markets. 
4.  RequiReS an oveRhaul oF eneRgy  
anD enviRonmental taxeS in the tax coDe
Consistent with the enactment of a new carbon tax, exist-
ing tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code would require 
review for consistency and “deadwood” overhaul. Legacy deci-
sions of the past are not the building blocks of our national 
future. The outdated or inconsistent provisions in the tax code 
must be removed as part of a carbon tax enactment. A tax or 
fee could be levied on CO2 emissions, which would establish 
the costs of such emissions with clarity. The market can then 
establish the emission level and degree of market penetration in 
a revenue neutral environment engaging in classic tax planning 
and capital investment in carbon tax avoidance strategies. This 
fosters a more productive market transaction than the artificial 
cap-and-trade scheme with uncertain prices, little transparency, 
additionality and verification concerns—with no corresponding 
guarantees of similar levels of capital support for investment in 
physical assets to reduce carbon. 
5. pRoblemS with Social StewaRDShip
The neediest citizens of our country need a set-aside of 
funds from any new tax revenues. This set-aside should be split 
between improving multi-family housing stock upon audit and 
Low Income Housing Energy Assistance Program fuel assis-
tance, and affordable housing incentives, structures and support 
administered through state, county, and city governments and 
foundations. A cap-and-trade system offers no contribution to 
our obligations for social stewardship.
6. wateR impact analySiS
No carbon strategy should be considered credible without 
analyzing the water impact of the technology choices and strate-
gies for the future. Specifically, the analysis should include the 
technology’s impact on water resources, water availability, and 
sustainability for CO2 purposes administered through EPA and 
the Army Corps of Engineers.
conclusIon
A fair assessment of these strategy alternatives and imple-
mentation consequences is critical because the national choices 
we make in managing carbon will become the foundation of 
the next environmental initiatives: water management, brown-
field restoration, and new patterns of U.S. real estate and com-
munity development. The business model, market solution, and 
strategies for CO2 will set the stage for the next global trading 
product—water rights—because of its implications for health, 
new power generation, food, and weather impacts on famine, 
economic growth, and power production.
Our future course in managing carbon may be unclear, but 
the stakes involved in the choice between a new trading system 
or the tax system are quite high. After watching market based 
responses artificially built around trading and financial risk 
management from savings and loans, dot-coms, electric power 
marketing, natural gas marketing, agricultural commodities, and 
sub-prime mortgage lending, a fresh innovative approach built 
around the federal tax system could become a powerful tool of 
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market-based action across stationary, mobile, and building emis-
sion sources. This true market-based approach also ensures that 
physical investment will match with financial risk management 
strategies to diminish volatility and achieve the desired result. 
Other financial derivatives wrapped around trading schemes do 
not provide that comfort, and limit the return and benefits to nar-
row sectors of society and create distortions in markets.
The consequences of a developed and imposed carbon tax 
should be consistently offset against other less desirable business 
and individual taxes striving for revenue neutrality. The reve-
nues should never be converted into sources of new funding for 
grand social programs or legislative earmarks that benefit politi-
cal elites, instead of benefiting true markets, U.S. companies, 
industries, and the underlying public policy objectives of the 
carbon tax operating in a global economy. Carbon can become a 
driver for innovation and job creation and technology advance-
ment in the 21st century as opposed to being a mere externality. 
Success will depend upon the choices we make managing the 
laws of science, economics, and politics with balance and true 
protection of U.S. markets and industry. In addressing honestly 
the greatest market failure of the 20th century, we can create an 
economic renaissance built on sustainable and sound technology 
and business practices.
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The snow that falls in the Rockies’ Sierra Sangre de Cristo range holds water during the winter months, slowly releasing water over the spring and summer months into 
the tributaries and aquifers that feed the Rio Grande basin.1 As 
the climate continues to warm, the ability of the Rio Grande basin 
to replenish itself may become increasingly threatened as snow-
pack decreases and evaporation rates increase.2 Past droughts 
and environmental catastrophes are archeologically preserved in 
the ruins of ancient southwestern cities such as Chaco Canyon3 
and serve as dire warnings of what may occur in a dryer climate. 
As the Southwest prepares for population growth and increased 
water scarcity, Albuquerque and El Paso’s stories illustrate how 
the destinies of all the communities in the Rio Grande valley are 
intertwined.
In the 1980s, New Mexico and the city of El Paso litigated 
and negotiated water rights in federal court and before the New 
Mexico State Engineer.4 New Mexico’s “beneficial use” provi-
sion in its state Constitution and related water management stat-
utes place strict restrictions on water exports.5 Eventually, New 
Mexico was not compelled to provide its water to El Paso, thus 
allowing farmers and cities in the state to keep part of an already 
limited supply of water from booming El Paso.6 As a result, El 
Paso was forced to pump more water out of its aquifer in the 
Hueco Bolson. El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, which both draw 
water from the Hueco Bolson water basin, have been estimated 
to have as little as two years of freshwater remaining in their 
aquifer and both face population growth.7
El Paso is experiencing increased growth because of mili-
tary base realignments, which will add nearly 28,000 soldiers, 
not to mention their families, to Fort Bliss through 2013.8 With 
limited groundwater or water from the Rio Grande to sustain 
growth, the city of El Paso turned to the federal government and 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) for federal assistance.9 
The solution was the largest inland desalination plant in the 
world, meant to treat the remaining brackish ground water and 
ensure El Paso’s future growth.10 It is estimated that depleting 
the Hueco will enable the city of El Paso to maintain an esti-
mated fifty years of projected growth.11 The Hueco, however, is 
not easily recharged and there appear to be no plans for the city 
if the Hueco is tapped dry.
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